loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to process user-generated notes and critic verdicts to steer its building attempts, which is a classic ingestion point for untrusted instructions.
- Ingestion points: External feedback is received via the
helix loop waitcommand (yieldingnote.added) and the/api/stateendpoint. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or instructions for the agent to disregard malicious directives embedded within these text fields.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
BashandPowerShelltools to execute thehelixbinary, write to the filesystem, and interact with local network services. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the feedback strings before they are incorporated into the agent's task context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to manage local processes and orchestrate sub-agents.
- Evidence: The skill provides a command to terminate processes by extracting a PID from a configuration file using
sed:kill "$(sed -n 's/.*"pid": *\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p' .../server.json)". - Evidence: The lead agent is responsible for constructing and issuing CLI commands to builder and critic sub-agents.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill performs requests to a local service to retrieve operational state.
- Evidence: The skill uses
curlto accesshttp://127.0.0.1:$PORT/api/state, where the port is dynamically parsed from a local metadata file.
Audit Metadata