spark
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a platform-provided binary
helixfor session management operations (up, push, wait, rails). It also usescurlto interact with a local API endpoint on127.0.0.1andkillto manage its own server process by PID. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses application-specific state and configuration files located in the
~/.helix/spark/directory. This is used for session persistence and process management. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data which constitutes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via user chat messages (
chat.added), verdicts (response.added), and board updates (card.updated), as well as the reading of external codebase files during ideation. - Boundary markers: Behavioral boundaries are enforced through a specialized rails system (
helix rails for --surface spark). - Capability inventory: Shell execution is limited to the
helixbinary via frontmatter restrictions, along with local API access viacurland process management viakill. - Sanitization: The skill instructions mandate the use of shell heredocs (
<<'EOF') when pushing payloads to prevent command injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains strong directives to the agent, such as a "Hard rule" forbidding file writes and instructions that behavior is "ratified." These are functional safety constraints designed to keep the agent within its intended scope rather than malicious bypass attempts.
Audit Metadata