telegram-bot-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the Telegram API via the
get_updatesmethod inscripts/list_chats.pyandscripts/contacts.py. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the agent processes message content. \n - Ingestion points:
scripts/telegram_bot.py(viabot.get_updates),scripts/list_chats.py, andscripts/contacts.pyfetch incoming user messages. \n - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are present to separate external content from system instructions. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-read and network-send capabilities in
scripts/send_file.pyandscripts/send_photo.py. \n - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of external message content is performed. \n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes functionality to read local files and photos and upload them to Telegram's servers (
scripts/send_file.pyandscripts/send_photo.py). While this is the intended functionality of a Telegram bot, it serves as a technical vector for exfiltrating sensitive local files if the agent is directed to do so. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation inreferences/examples.mdprovides examples of using thesubprocessmodule to execute system commands, such asimportfor screen capture. This demonstrates how users or agents could extend the skill with potentially risky system operations.
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