aigc-video-gen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied prompts and remote media content which are then transmitted to external AIGC APIs and processed by local media tools.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts user prompts via the
--promptargument and handles external media URLs or local file paths via--image,--last-frame,--ref-image,--ref-video, and--ref-audioin the provider-specific scripts (gen_dashscope.py,gen_minimax.py, andgen_volc.py). - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement specific boundary markers or delimiters to separate instructions from user-provided data within the generated prompts sent to AIGC providers.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runfor media processing viaffmpegandffprobeinscripts/aigc_common.py, performs network requests viaurllib.requestto interact with AIGC APIs and download generated content, and writes media and metadata files to the local filesystem. - Sanitization: File output paths are strictly validated using the
ensure_safe_outputfunction inscripts/aigc_common.py, which prevents directory traversal and restricts writes to a set of predefined safe directories. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto executeffmpegandffprobefor media metadata extraction and frame capturing inscripts/aigc_common.py. These commands are executed using list-based arguments which mitigates shell injection risks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads generated media files from remote provider URLs (DashScope, Volcengine, and MiniMax) using
urllib.requestinscripts/aigc_common.py. These are legitimate operations targeting well-known service providers.
Audit Metadata