netlify-deploy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to bypass sandbox restrictions by requesting escalated permissions (
sandbox_permissions=require_escalated) if network calls are blocked. While this facilitates deployment to a well-known service, it encourages bypassing security boundaries. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's metadata contains conflicting authorship information. The YAML frontmatter claims the author is
github.com/openai/skills, whereas the provided context indicates the author istech-leads-club. This discrepancy could mislead users regarding the skill's origin and safety. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted project data that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Reads
package.json,netlify.toml, and Git remote configuration from the local project. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or delimiters to ignore potential malicious content within these files.
- Capability inventory: Includes execution of
npx netlifyandnpm install, which could be exploited if malicious configuration is ingested. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or sanitization for project-controlled files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing external commands such as
npx netlifyandnpm install. While necessary for deployment, runningnpm installon potentially untrusted project directories poses a risk if malicious dependencies are present. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npx netlifyto download and execute the Netlify CLI package from the npm registry. While Netlify is a well-known service, this involves runtime code acquisition.
Audit Metadata