clickup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The setup protocol in
protocols/setup.mdinstructions the agent to clone a repository fromgithub.com/TechTechWizard/claude-work-tools.gitand execute a script namedinstall.sh. This involves running unverified code from an external source on the user's system.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill instructs the agent to help the user modify shell configuration files such as~/.zshrcor~/.bashrcto update thePATHenvironment variable. Modifying these files is a standard persistence mechanism that allows code to run automatically in future sessions.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches and processes ClickUp task descriptions and user comments (viaclickup taskandclickup commentsinprotocols/read-task.md). This external data could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent's behavior.\n - Ingestion points: External task data and comments are ingested through the
clickupCLI.\n - Boundary markers: The skill relies on natural language instructions for the agent to summarize tasks in its own words, which provides a weak boundary against injection.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
BashandWritetools and uses a custom CLI tool for task management.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of programmatic sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from the ClickUp API.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the
claude-work-toolsrepository from a remote GitHub source during its setup phase.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of theBashtool to run theclickupCLI,git, and other shell-based installation commands.
Audit Metadata