cowork-export
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/export_context.pyusessubprocess.runto executegitcommands and thepbcopyutility. This allows the skill to interact with the local operating system and clipboard functionality.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill collects and prepares project-sensitive data for export. Theread_filesfunction inscripts/export_context.pylacks strict path validation, creating a potential directory traversal vulnerability where an agent could be manipulated into reading files outside the intended project directory by using relative paths like../../.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through the data it aggregates.\n - Ingestion points: In
scripts/export_context.py, the script reads git commit history, diffs, and arbitrary file contents provided via the--include-filesflag.\n - Boundary markers: The output briefing document uses markdown headers and code blocks to separate sections, but lacks explicit instructions to ignore any agent-directives found within the ingested data.\n
- Capability inventory: The script uses
subprocess.runto callgitandpbcopyinscripts/export_context.py.\n - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is applied to the content read from files or git, allowing malicious instructions in the codebase to propagate into the exported document.
Audit Metadata