image-ai-generator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The invoke command in SKILL.md uses string interpolation for the {prompt} and {output} variables inside a shell command. If these variables contain shell metacharacters, it can lead to arbitrary code execution on the underlying host.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The load_api_key function in scripts/generate.py searches for .env files in parent directories up to three levels deep. The key name is constructed using string concatenation ("OPENROUTER_API" + "_KEY="), which is a technique used to evade static analysis tools searching for hardcoded secret names.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill can read any local file provided to the --reference argument and send its contents to the OpenRouter API. This capability can be misused to exfiltrate sensitive local data.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to the external API at https://openrouter.ai to perform image generation tasks, which involves sending user data and prompts to a third-party service.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from prompts and batch JSON files without adequate sanitization or boundary enforcement.
  • Ingestion points: Prompts provided via the command line and batch files read from args.batch.
  • Boundary markers: None present; the prompts are directly embedded into the API request content.
  • Capability inventory: Network access through urllib.request and local file creation via open(output_path, "wb").
  • Sanitization: No validation or escaping is applied to the input data before it is sent to the AI model.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 29, 2026, 09:44 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — image-ai-generator