image-ai-generator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
invokecommand inSKILL.mduses string interpolation for the{prompt}and{output}variables inside a shell command. If these variables contain shell metacharacters, it can lead to arbitrary code execution on the underlying host. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
load_api_keyfunction inscripts/generate.pysearches for.envfiles in parent directories up to three levels deep. The key name is constructed using string concatenation ("OPENROUTER_API" + "_KEY="), which is a technique used to evade static analysis tools searching for hardcoded secret names. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill can read any local file provided to the
--referenceargument and send its contents to the OpenRouter API. This capability can be misused to exfiltrate sensitive local data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to the external API at
https://openrouter.aito perform image generation tasks, which involves sending user data and prompts to a third-party service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from prompts and batch JSON files without adequate sanitization or boundary enforcement.
- Ingestion points: Prompts provided via the command line and batch files read from
args.batch. - Boundary markers: None present; the prompts are directly embedded into the API request content.
- Capability inventory: Network access through
urllib.requestand local file creation viaopen(output_path, "wb"). - Sanitization: No validation or escaping is applied to the input data before it is sent to the AI model.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata