design-blueprint
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes existing context anchor documents and external requirement links during 'Step 1: Establish Context' as defined in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present to isolate external content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill orchestrates peer framework skills (such as framework:architecture and framework:context-anchoring) to document architectural decisions and model components; it lacks direct access to high-privilege system commands or unauthorized network access.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the ingested document content.
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