tanstack-ai-code-mode
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an architecture where the agent writes and executes code via the
execute_typescripttool. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the model processes untrusted external data. - Ingestion points: The
execute_typescripttool receives model-generated code as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions recommend using a short instructional note above declarations in a fenced
typescriptblock to separate system instructions from tool definitions. - Capability inventory: Execution is limited to defined
external_*tools andconsolefunctions within a QuickJS sandbox. The environment lacksfetch,require, and system timers by default. - Sanitization: The instructions emphasize performing rigorous type-checking and throwing on compiler diagnostics during the
transpilephase before execution. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Technical reference documentation indicates that the
snippetToToolcomponent logs inputs and code directly to server logs. This represents a data exposure risk if sensitive information is processed through these snippets. - Evidence:
references/hidden-knowledge.mddocumentation regardingsnippetToToollogging behavior: "console.logs inputs and code (data in server logs)". - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill describes a system for runtime transpilation and execution of code. It notes that the default transpiler only removes type annotations (stripping) and does not validate code safety or correctness, requiring developers to implement their own safety checks.
- Evidence: Detailed breakdown of the execution flow, Sucrase limitations, and the
JSON.parse/JSON.stringifyboundary logic inreferences/hidden-knowledge.md.
Audit Metadata