harvest
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes session transcripts from various platforms to identify "candidates" for permanent project instructions. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions present in the session history (e.g., from external content the agent processed earlier) could be persisted into the project's root instruction files.
- Ingestion points: Platform-specific transcript files (e.g.,
~/.claude/projects/*.jsonl,~/.cursor/.../*.jsonl,~/.copilot/session-state/*.jsonl) defined inHARNESSES.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions to disregard or sanitize embedded commands within the ingested transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill modifies the repository's core instruction files (
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md) and can create new project skills in directories like.agents/skills/. - Sanitization: No explicit filtering or sanitization of transcript content is performed during the extraction process.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive session logs and native memory stores located in the user's home directory (e.g.,
~/.claude/projects/,~/.cursor/projects/,~/.copilot/session-store.db). These files contain histories of user interactions that may include sensitive information or credentials shared during the session. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
git statusand git diffing to analyze repository state and identify relevant artifacts modified during the session.
Audit Metadata