skills/tejas-kale/skills/harvest/Gen Agent Trust Hub

harvest

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes session transcripts from various platforms to identify "candidates" for permanent project instructions. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions present in the session history (e.g., from external content the agent processed earlier) could be persisted into the project's root instruction files.
  • Ingestion points: Platform-specific transcript files (e.g., ~/.claude/projects/*.jsonl, ~/.cursor/.../*.jsonl, ~/.copilot/session-state/*.jsonl) defined in HARNESSES.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions to disregard or sanitize embedded commands within the ingested transcripts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill modifies the repository's core instruction files (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md) and can create new project skills in directories like .agents/skills/.
  • Sanitization: No explicit filtering or sanitization of transcript content is performed during the extraction process.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive session logs and native memory stores located in the user's home directory (e.g., ~/.claude/projects/, ~/.cursor/projects/, ~/.copilot/session-store.db). These files contain histories of user interactions that may include sensitive information or credentials shared during the session.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes git status and git diffing to analyze repository state and identify relevant artifacts modified during the session.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 19, 2026, 11:56 AM