kendo-angular-getting-started
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute shell commands for project initialization, package management, and license activation. User-provided arguments such as[project-name]and[--theme=<theme>]are interpolated directly into these shell commands (e.g.,ng new <project-name>andng add ... --theme=<theme>) without explicit sanitization instructions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses vulnerability surfaces for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via user-supplied arguments in
SKILL.md([project-name],[theme]). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks clear boundary markers or instructions for the agent to treat these inputs as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including shell command execution and file system write operations across all scripts.
- Sanitization: There is no escaping, validation, or filtering applied to the external content before it is interpolated into command strings.
- Multi-step chains: The sample code generated in
new-project.mdcontains hashtag triggers (e.g.,#kendo_ui_generator) designed to influence or trigger subsequent agent actions in a pipeline. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads official vendor packages from the NPM registry and CSS assets from the
unpkg.comCDN. These resources originate from the official vendor infrastructure (telerik/@progress) and are legitimate components for the Kendo UI framework.
Audit Metadata