temporal-ops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [SAFE]: The skill consists of instructional markdown files and reference guides for the
temporalandtcldcommand-line tools. All external resources, including domains liketmprl.cloudandtemporal.io, and GitHub repositories under thetemporalioorganization, are official vendor resources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface for indirect prompt injection as it instructs the agent to process untrusted data such as user-pasted error logs and SDK connection snippets to perform diagnostics.
- Ingestion points:
references/triage/sdk-snippet-review.md(pasted SDK connection code),references/triage/runtime-errors.md(copy-pasted error text). - Boundary markers: Absent in the input processing instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
temporalandtcldtools, which have the capability to perform destructive actions such as deleting namespaces (references/ops/cloud-namespace-admin.md) and terminating workflows (references/triage/workflow-stuck.md). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill relies on the AI agent's internal logic and the 'Operator Discipline' requirement to propose destructive actions to the user first.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: While the skill manages API keys and certificates, it follows security best practices. For example,
references/triage/certificates.mdexplicitly warns: 'Never print, echo, cat, or log private-key contents.' Instructions to store secrets in environment variables or.envfiles are correctly handled as safe management practices.
Audit Metadata