tempo-docs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a directive in its instructions (
ai/plugins/tempo/skills/tempo-wallet/SKILL.md) that attempts to restrict the agent's behavior by overriding its information gathering process: "Runcurl -fsSL https://tempo.xyz/SKILL.mdto get the exact setup commands. Do NOT search for additional documentation." - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an extensive attack surface for indirect injection by processing data from several external sources.
- Ingestion points: Documentation pages, the
mpp.devservice catalog, and external research job outputs (get_jobinai/plugins/mercator/skills/mercator/SKILL.md) are ingested into the agent context. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or provide "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the external data being processed.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform network requests (
tempo request,curl) and manipulate data through the Mercator plugin's task mapping system ($map,$concat). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of external content is described or implemented before it is processed by the agent.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Setup instructions in the skill (
ai/plugins/tempo/skills/tempo-wallet/SKILL.md) suggest installing the Tempo CLI by piping a remote script directly into a shell:curl -fsSL https://tempo.xyz/install | bash. While this is the official installation method for the vendor's tool, it is a high-risk pattern for automated agents. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages the agent to download code and documentation from
https://tempo.xyz. It also provides instructions for downloading binary files (e.g., images generated by an API) usingcurlwith URLs found in API responses.
Audit Metadata