trtc-push
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references the use of an external MCP tool,
@tencent-rtc/trtc-push-mcp, to handle the logic of the integration workflow. This package is hosted under the official Tencent RTC scope on npm, aligning with the skill's authorship. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The integration instructions guide the user to execute platform-standard build and dependency commands, such as
./gradlewfor Android andpod installfor iOS. These are necessary and expected for the primary purpose of the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts user-provided prompts which are forwarded to the external workflow engine. While this represents a data ingestion surface, the risk is mitigated by the narrow domain of TIMPush integration and the use of a vendor-provided logic engine.
- Ingestion points:
user_promptfield inSKILL.mdpassed to theget_workflow_statetool. - Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined in the provided instruction text.
- Capability inventory: Significant; the workflow engine can suggest file modifications and command executions to facilitate SDK setup.
- Sanitization: Not specified, relying on the underlying LLM's safety filters.
- [SAFE]: The skill explicitly warns against hardcoding secrets like
SDKAppIDorAppKey. It provides templates and instructions to uselocal.properties(Android) and gitignored source files (iOS) to protect credentials, which is an industry-standard security practice.
Audit Metadata