agently-mail
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted email content which serves as a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested through the
agently-cli message +read,+list, and+searchcommands as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill contains explicit instructions to the agent to treat email body and subject content strictly as data and to ignore any embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to send, reply, forward, and delete emails, as well as download attachments to the local file system.
- Sanitization: A mandatory two-stage confirmation mechanism is enforced for all destructive or outgoing operations (+send, +reply, +forward, +trash), ensuring that the agent cannot execute these actions without explicit human approval after reviewing the operation summary.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
@tencent-qqmail/agently-clipackage and usesnpxto add the skill content. - Evidence:
npm install -g @tencent-qqmail/agently-cliandnpx skills add Tencent/AgentlyMail -g -y. - These resources originate from the official infrastructure of the vendor (Tencent) and are standard for the skill's functionality.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary functionality is delivered through the execution of shell commands using the
agently-clitool. - Evidence: Use of various commands such as
agently-cli message +sendandagently-cli attachment +downloadto manage email resources.
Audit Metadata