teneo-cli

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive blockchain credentials and provides a wallet-export-key command that displays the raw private key to the user (SKILL.md).\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions trigger a download and execution of the Teneo CLI tool from the public npm registry using npx -y @teneo-protocol/cli if the local binary is not present.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The agent deploy workflow installs new agents as background services that persist across reboots, utilizing system service managers such as systemd on Linux and launchd on macOS.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell command execution for its primary workflows, including managing a background daemon and interacting with the local filesystem.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The agent deploy command performs runtime compilation of Go source code into an executable binary before service installation.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data fetched from various external network agents which may contain untrusted information.\n
  • Ingestion points: External data is ingested from third-party agents via the teneo command interface (SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: Missing. The skill instructions do not require the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when returning agent output to the user context.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell command execution, system service management, WebSocket network communication, and blockchain transaction signing (SKILL.md).\n
  • Sanitization: Missing. There are no defined procedures in the skill instructions for sanitizing or escaping the content returned by external agents before it is processed by the AI.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 09:58 PM