herdr-faq
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to execute inline scripts that modify the underlying configuration of third-party tools (Claude Code and Antigravity) to bypass security-critical trust dialogs.\n
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains blocks that write to~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/settings.jsonand create customCLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRenvironments to sethasTrustDialogAcceptedtotrueautomatically.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes a pattern for driving agents where content from external files is interpolated directly into prompts, creating an exploitation surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Data is read from
brief.mdandnote.mdfiles.\n - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the sub-agent to ignore potential malicious content within the interpolated files.\n
- Capability inventory: Through the
herdrCLI, the skill can perform shell operations, split terminal panes, and drive agents with broad file system permissions.\n - Sanitization: The recipes do not include sanitization or validation steps for the content read from files before it is submitted as a prompt.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on complex shell command sequences, subshell execution (
$(...)), and backgrounded processes to manage terminal multiplexers and sub-agents, which increases the risk of command injection.
Audit Metadata