skills/tenequm/skills/herdr-faq/Gen Agent Trust Hub

herdr-faq

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to execute inline scripts that modify the underlying configuration of third-party tools (Claude Code and Antigravity) to bypass security-critical trust dialogs.\n
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains blocks that write to ~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/settings.json and create custom CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR environments to set hasTrustDialogAccepted to true automatically.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes a pattern for driving agents where content from external files is interpolated directly into prompts, creating an exploitation surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
  • Ingestion points: Data is read from brief.md and note.md files.\n
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to the sub-agent to ignore potential malicious content within the interpolated files.\n
  • Capability inventory: Through the herdr CLI, the skill can perform shell operations, split terminal panes, and drive agents with broad file system permissions.\n
  • Sanitization: The recipes do not include sanitization or validation steps for the content read from files before it is submitted as a prompt.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on complex shell command sequences, subshell execution ($(...)), and backgrounded processes to manage terminal multiplexers and sub-agents, which increases the risk of command injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 11, 2026, 09:08 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — herdr-faq