herdr-faq
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily utilizes the
herdrCLI to launch subagents, send keystrokes to terminal panes, and manage lifecycle states. This includes complex shell piping and orchestration logic to drive external processes. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses and modifies sensitive local configuration files, specifically
~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/settings.jsonand.claude.json. These actions are performed to programmatically bypass folder-trust security dialogs intended to protect the user's filesystem from unauthorized agent access. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Employs a Python heredoc to dynamically generate and execute a script at runtime that modifies JSON configuration files to inject trusted workspaces.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill reads raw terminal output and detection state from third-party agents using
herdr agent readandherdr pane read(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are used when processing agent output; logic relies on raw text matching via
grepandjq. - Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to start/rename agents, send prompts, and modify local configuration files.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested agent output before it is used to influence the skill's decision logic or troubleshooting steps.
Audit Metadata