baoyu-post-to-wechat
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/check-permissions.tsfile contains a log message and user instruction suggesting the installation of the Bun runtime via a command piped directly to bash:curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash. Although targeting a well-known service, this pattern is a significant security risk as it executes remote scripts without prior local validation. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/md/utils/languages.tsdynamically loads syntax highlighting grammars by importing JavaScript modules from a remote Aliyun OSS bucket (cdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com) at runtime using computed paths. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime code generation and execution to manage system clipboard operations. Specifically,
scripts/copy-to-clipboard.tsandscripts/check-permissions.tsgenerate Swift source code as strings, write them to temporary files, and execute them via theswiftcommand to interact with the macOS AppKit API. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/md-to-wechat.tsscript fetches remote images from arbitrary URLs found in markdown content using thehttpandhttpsmodules to resolve local assets for the WeChat editor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of subprocess execution (
spawnSync,execSync) to run external tools and system utilities, includingnpx,osascript,powershell.exe,xdotool, and the vendor-specificagent-browserCLI tool.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://bun.sh/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata