baoyu-post-to-wechat

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The scripts/check-permissions.ts file contains a log message and user instruction suggesting the installation of the Bun runtime via a command piped directly to bash: curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash. Although targeting a well-known service, this pattern is a significant security risk as it executes remote scripts without prior local validation.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/md/utils/languages.ts dynamically loads syntax highlighting grammars by importing JavaScript modules from a remote Aliyun OSS bucket (cdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com) at runtime using computed paths.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime code generation and execution to manage system clipboard operations. Specifically, scripts/copy-to-clipboard.ts and scripts/check-permissions.ts generate Swift source code as strings, write them to temporary files, and execute them via the swift command to interact with the macOS AppKit API.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts/md-to-wechat.ts script fetches remote images from arbitrary URLs found in markdown content using the http and https modules to resolve local assets for the WeChat editor.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of subprocess execution (spawnSync, execSync) to run external tools and system utilities, including npx, osascript, powershell.exe, xdotool, and the vendor-specific agent-browser CLI tool.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://bun.sh/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 24, 2026, 12:17 AM