chatgpt-pro-coding-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external tools including
daijro/camoufoxfor browser automation andrebel0789/codexprofor MCP transport. These are utilized as the core infrastructure for the multi-agent workflow. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow orchestrates local environment operations through a series of
npm runanduvcommands to handle preflight checks, browser management, and task manifests. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the ChatGPT Web surface. This risk is mitigated by a mandatory evidence chain:
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from the ChatGPT composer and conversation history via the Camoufox loopback bridge (monitored in
scripts/protocol.mjs). - Boundary markers: The protocol enforces a unique
sentinelstring generated at task creation; the skill ignores any completion that does not include this sentinel in the assistant's final turn. - Capability inventory: The local agent has file write and shell execution capabilities via the MCP server to integrate candidate code.
- Sanitization: All remote suggestions are subjected to mandatory local verification including linting, type-checking, unit tests, and human-in-the-loop review before being marked as
CODEX_VERIFIED. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a security-conscious 'Bundle' fallback for non-MCP environments, which uses an automated scanner to block the inclusion of credentials, private keys, and environment files before source code is uploaded to the external model.
Audit Metadata