chatgpt-pro-coding-agent

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external tools including daijro/camoufox for browser automation and rebel0789/codexpro for MCP transport. These are utilized as the core infrastructure for the multi-agent workflow.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow orchestrates local environment operations through a series of npm run and uv commands to handle preflight checks, browser management, and task manifests.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the ChatGPT Web surface. This risk is mitigated by a mandatory evidence chain:
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched from the ChatGPT composer and conversation history via the Camoufox loopback bridge (monitored in scripts/protocol.mjs).
  • Boundary markers: The protocol enforces a unique sentinel string generated at task creation; the skill ignores any completion that does not include this sentinel in the assistant's final turn.
  • Capability inventory: The local agent has file write and shell execution capabilities via the MCP server to integrate candidate code.
  • Sanitization: All remote suggestions are subjected to mandatory local verification including linting, type-checking, unit tests, and human-in-the-loop review before being marked as CODEX_VERIFIED.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a security-conscious 'Bundle' fallback for non-MCP environments, which uses an automated scanner to block the inclusion of credentials, private keys, and environment files before source code is uploaded to the external model.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 3, 2026, 04:43 AM