multi-model-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup instructions guide the user to install the
@openai/codexglobal NPM package and several platform-specific plugins (openai/codex-plugin-cc,codex@openai-codex). These resources are hosted by a well-known service provider and are documented as part of the intended functionality. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator model is instructed to execute the
/codex:rescuecommand, which interfaces with the Codex CLI. This allows the agent to perform engineering tasks and solve problems through an external command-line interface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an orchestrator that ingests and processes potentially untrusted data to delegate tasks, creating a surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through user-provided 'Goal' descriptions and codebase 'Context' files during the orchestration process.
- Boundary markers: The delegation briefs defined in the instructions do not use explicit delimiters or instructions to prevent the sub-agents from executing commands that might be embedded within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill maintains the capability to modify project files (via the
fast-workersub-agent) and execute shell-level commands (via theCodexCLI integration). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of input data before it is interpolated into the prompts used to brief the sub-agents.
Audit Metadata