The Agent Skills Directory

[DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The provided synchronization daemon script in SKILL.md is vulnerable to path traversal. It listens for dropbox_pull events from remote peers and uses the provided filename field to construct a file path for pilotctl send-file.
Evidence: pilotctl --json send-file "$FROM" "$DROPBOX_DIR/$FILENAME" in the dropbox_pull case block.
Risk: Because the filename is not sanitized, a malicious peer could send a path like ../../.ssh/id_rsa to trigger the exfiltration of sensitive files from the agent's home directory.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's workflow logic performs file system operations using unvalidated input from a network protocol.
Evidence: The script executes rm -f "$DROPBOX_DIR/$FILENAME" based on file_removed events received via pilotctl subscribe.
Risk: An attacker can delete arbitrary files accessible to the agent process by providing a relative path (e.g., filename: "../../important_data.txt") in the event payload.

pilot-dropbox