claude-mem
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install unverified software packages globally and via package managers.
- Evidence:
npm install -g claude-mem(from thedotmack/claude-mem) andpip install letta(from letta-ai). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands to initialize tools and modify system behavior.
- Evidence:
claude-mem init,claude-mem setup-hooks, andletta servercommands are used to integrate the tools into the development environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The tools described are designed to capture, summarize, and store full session histories.
- Evidence: Session interactions (including potentially sensitive code and data) are recorded and either stored locally in
.claude-mem/or sent to external services like Letta (cloud or self-hosted) or Claude APIs for compression. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by design.
- Ingestion points: Session activity and interactions are captured from the active Claude Code environment (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: None identified in the provided configuration or instructions to distinguish between trusted and untrusted historical context.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
claude-mem injectto feed captured history back into the LLM context, which could lead to the execution of instructions hidden in previous session logs. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of captured session data before re-injection is provided.
Audit Metadata