fal-ai
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, including prompts and media URLs, which are passed to remote generative models. This constitutes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Prompt strings and external URLs (e.g., image_url, audio_url) are passed as arguments to
fal.subscribe()andfal.queue.submit()inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not demonstrate the use of delimiters or specific boundary instructions to separate user data from model instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to read local files via
fs.readFileSyncand perform network operations to transmit data to the service endpoint. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of user-provided content is shown in the provided examples.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to download and install official client libraries from standard package registries (NPM and PyPI).
- Evidence:
npm install @fal-ai/clientandpip install fal-clientare listed as installation steps inSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Code examples in the skill demonstrate local file system access for the purpose of selecting media files to upload to the service.
- Evidence: The skill uses
fs.readFileSync("audio.mp3")in the TypeScript example andfal_client.upload_file("./photo.png")in the Python example to prepare files for processing.
Audit Metadata