image-to-text
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the
tesseract.jspackage and associated OCR language models at runtime. - Evidence:
scripts/image-to-text.shexecutesnpm installifnode_modulesis missing. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdnotes that the first run downloads approximately 4MB of language data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell script which in turn invokes a Node.js process to perform the text extraction.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runbash <skill-path>/scripts/image-to-text.sh <image-path> [language]. - Evidence:
scripts/image-to-text.shexecutesnode "$SCRIPT_DIR/image-to-text.js" "$@". - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it extracts and returns raw text from untrusted image sources without sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: The
<image-path>argument inscripts/image-to-text.shallows the agent to process arbitrary image files. - Boundary markers: Absent. The extracted text is returned as a JSON object and presented directly to the agent without delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes shell and Node.js scripts via subprocess calls in
scripts/image-to-text.shandscripts/image-to-text.js. - Sanitization: Absent. The extracted text is trimmed but otherwise unmodified before being returned to the agent.
Audit Metadata