image-to-text

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the tesseract.js package and associated OCR language models at runtime.
  • Evidence: scripts/image-to-text.sh executes npm install if node_modules is missing.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md notes that the first run downloads approximately 4MB of language data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell script which in turn invokes a Node.js process to perform the text extraction.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md instructs the agent to run bash <skill-path>/scripts/image-to-text.sh <image-path> [language].
  • Evidence: scripts/image-to-text.sh executes node "$SCRIPT_DIR/image-to-text.js" "$@".
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it extracts and returns raw text from untrusted image sources without sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: The <image-path> argument in scripts/image-to-text.sh allows the agent to process arbitrary image files.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The extracted text is returned as a JSON object and presented directly to the agent without delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes shell and Node.js scripts via subprocess calls in scripts/image-to-text.sh and scripts/image-to-text.js.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The extracted text is trimmed but otherwise unmodified before being returned to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 26, 2026, 11:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — image-to-text