kubernetes-helm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied application requirements (e.g., 'Deploy: Node.js API...') to generate Kubernetes manifests and Helm charts. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the data provided by the user.
- Ingestion points: User input describing infrastructure stacks, deployment requirements, and tenant configurations as seen in the Examples section of SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit delimiters or system instructions defined to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the user-provided data.
- Capability inventory: The skill documentation includes high-privilege commands such as
kubectl execfor container shell access,helm upgrade --installfor cluster modifications, andkubectl logsfor data retrieval. - Sanitization: Not defined within the skill logic. While the guidelines recommend external image scanning with Trivy, there is no validation of the generated YAML or shell commands against injection attacks.
Audit Metadata