spiderfoot
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches the SpiderFoot framework source code from a well-known repository on GitHub (
github.com/smicallef/spiderfoot) during the installation phase. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses the command line to clone the repository, install dependencies via
pip, and execute the tool's main entry point (sf.py). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Employs Python's
subprocess.runinSKILL.mdto programmatically invoke the SpiderFoot CLI with parameters derived from function inputs. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it aggregates data from over 200 external sources and presents it to the agent.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the
parse_sf_outputfunction inSKILL.md, which reads JSON files containing external scan results. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or instructions to treat the ingested OSINT data as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute shell commands (
subprocess.run) and perform network requests (requests.get/post). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the values retrieved from external data sources before they are processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata