agent-reach
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the core
agent-reachutility and several MCP servers from GitHub repositories, includinggithub.com/Panniantong/agent-reachandgithub.com/xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The preflight script fetches version metadata from the GitHub API and pipes the result to a Python interpreter to extract version strings. It also uses
pipxto install and upgrade the tool directly from a remote GitHub archive. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a wide array of system commands for tool installation and operation, including
pipx,pip,docker, and various CLI tools such asyt-dlp,gh,xhs, andtwitter. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages authentication for several platforms. It provides commands for the agent to configure API keys (e.g., Groq) and authentication tokens. Notably, it includes a feature to automatically extract session cookies from local browsers using the command
agent-reach configure --from-browser chrome. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an ingestion layer for data from numerous untrusted external sources, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Web content from Jina Reader and Exa, social media posts from X (Twitter), Weibo, Reddit, and Bilibili, and transcripts from YouTube and podcasts.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded in the external content are defined in the skill instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment allows shell execution (
bash), file system modifications within~/.agent-reach/and/tmp/, and broad network access. - Sanitization: The skill does not document any specific sanitization or filtering logic applied to the external data before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata