skills/terrylica/cc-skills/bootstrap/Gen Agent Trust Hub

bootstrap

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill attempts to retrieve GitHub authentication tokens from the environment or by executing the gh auth token command to authenticate repository operations.
  • Evidence: GH_TOKEN="${GH_TOKEN:-${GITHUB_TOKEN:-$(gh auth token 2>/dev/null || echo "")}}}" in SKILL.md.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill interacts with sensitive file paths by attempting to remove SSH control sockets to manage connection multiplexing.
  • Evidence: rm -f ~/.ssh/control-* and ssh -O exit git@github.com in SKILL.md.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and writes a shell script (tmp/bootstrap-claude-session.sh) to the local file system and changes its permissions to executable.
  • Evidence: Phase 4: Generate Bootstrap Script in SKILL.md using cat > "$OUTPUT_FILE" and chmod +x "$OUTPUT_FILE".
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill contains "Self-Evolving Skill" instructions that direct the AI to modify the SKILL.md file itself to address issues or drifted parameters.
  • Evidence: "Self-Evolving Skill: This skill improves through use. If instructions are wrong... fix this file immediately" in SKILL.md.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes repository URLs and branch names from the local environment and user arguments, which are then interpolated into shell scripts used for cloning and pushing data.
  • Ingestion points: git remote get-url origin and user-supplied arguments (-r, -b).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt interpolation.
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution (Bash), file writing (Write), and network operations (git push).
  • Sanitization: Uses standard shell variable expansion without explicit escaping for potential command injection in repository names.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 7, 2026, 02:12 AM