chezmoi-sync
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill contains a 'Self-Evolving Skill' policy and a 'Post-Execution Reflection' workflow that explicitly commands the agent to rewrite its own instruction file (
SKILL.md). This self-modification pattern allows for the persistence of unintended or malicious instructions if the agent's logic is influenced during runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes content from external files without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md(Step 1), the commandchezmoi diff --no-pagerreads the contents of locally modified dotfiles directly into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary markers or 'ignore' directives to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions contained within the dotfile contents or diff output.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
BashandEdittools. These allow it to execute system commands and modify files, including its own source instructions. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or validation for the data returned by the
chezmoitool before the agent acts upon it. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform sensitive operations includingchezmoi re-addand git operations (git commit,git push). While these are standard for dotfile management, they provide a mechanism for data exfiltration to remote repositories if the agent is manipulated into performing unintended syncs.
Audit Metadata