chezmoi-sync

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill contains a 'Self-Evolving Skill' policy and a 'Post-Execution Reflection' workflow that explicitly commands the agent to rewrite its own instruction file (SKILL.md). This self-modification pattern allows for the persistence of unintended or malicious instructions if the agent's logic is influenced during runtime.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes content from external files without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: In SKILL.md (Step 1), the command chezmoi diff --no-pager reads the contents of locally modified dotfiles directly into the agent's context.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary markers or 'ignore' directives to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions contained within the dotfile contents or diff output.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is granted Bash and Edit tools. These allow it to execute system commands and modify files, including its own source instructions.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or validation for the data returned by the chezmoi tool before the agent acts upon it.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to perform sensitive operations including chezmoi re-add and git operations (git commit, git push). While these are standard for dotfile management, they provide a mechanism for data exfiltration to remote repositories if the agent is manipulated into performing unintended syncs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 10:26 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — chezmoi-sync