crucible-research-foundations
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features 'Self-Evolution' instructions that direct the agent to 'update the relevant section' of the SKILL.md and append to logs based on runtime data. This represents a significant indirect prompt injection surface; if the agent processes malicious research findings or z-scores, those values or embedded instructions could be promoted into the skill's core definitions without human oversight.
- Ingestion points: Research results, z-score interpretations, and session findings (e.g., from 'Phase L-C').
- Boundary markers: None. The agent is instructed to integrate findings directly into prose sections.
- Capability inventory: Instructions to overwrite sections in
SKILL.mdand append toreferences/evolution-log.md. - Sanitization: None described; the agent is expected to 'draft a new section' based on session triggers.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the agent to perform file-writing operations to maintain an 'append-only ledger' and update the 'Confirmation counts' table. There is a conflict between these instructions and the skill's
allowed-toolsmetadata, which limits the environment to read-only tools (Read,Grep,Glob). If implemented in an environment that permits writing, the agent's behavior of modifying its own source files acts as a persistence mechanism for any logic changes. - [PERSISTENCE]: The requirement to maintain state across sessions by updating the 'Confirmation counts' and 'evolution-log.md' files ensures that any modifications (legitimate or malicious) persist beyond the current session lifecycle.
Audit Metadata