skills/terrylica/cc-skills/draft-hold/Gen Agent Trust Hub

draft-hold

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script utilizes several macOS-specific system utilities to integrate with the operating system.
  • It employs osascript to automate the macOS Notes application for creating, reading, and listing notes, and uses it for GUI scripting of the Stickies application via System Events.
  • It uses pbcopy to place draft content on the system clipboard, facilitating the mirroring of drafts into the Stickies application.
  • It uses the textutil utility to handle HTML-to-plain-text conversion when reading notes back into the agent environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's design introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The get command in draft-hold.sh retrieves the body of a note from macOS Notes. Because this note is intended for human editing, it constitutes an untrusted input source that could potentially contain malicious instructions if the note content is compromised.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses a ------ string as a visual separator for provenance metadata but lacks explicit instructions or markers to prevent the agent from following natural language commands found within the retrieved draft text.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to use the Bash tool, providing a path for any successfully injected instructions to execute commands or interact with the file system.
  • Sanitization: While the script performs HTML encoding and decoding to ensure data integrity, it does not sanitize the text content to detect or neutralize embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 24, 2026, 11:24 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — draft-hold