macos-font-defaults
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
apply.shexecutes shell commands includingdefaults,swift, andosascriptto modify system settings and manage applications. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes Swift code strings at runtime. In
apply.sh, the variables$FONTand$SIZE(passed via command-line arguments) are interpolated directly into the Swift command string forswift -e. Because these variables are not escaped or sanitized, a font name containing double quotes and Swift syntax (e.g.,\"; [code]; //) could be used to execute arbitrary Swift code on the machine. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data that influences its execution flow.
- Ingestion points: Arguments provided to the
apply.shscript, specifically--fontand--size, which are derived from the agent's instructions based on user input. - Boundary markers: None. The script does not employ delimiters or ignore-instructions to separate user-provided data from code logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including modifying system-wide preference plists, quitting running applications via AppleScript, and executing dynamic Swift code.
- Sanitization: There is a complete lack of sanitization or character escaping for the font name parameter before it is placed into an executable context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata