pr-gfm-validator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill contains 'Self-Evolving' instructions in
SKILL.mdthat explicitly direct the agent to 'fix this file immediately' if issues occur. Combined with the 'Post-Execution Reflection' which tells the agent to locate and edit theSKILL.mdfile, this creates a persistence mechanism. If an agent is subverted via prompt injection, it could modify its own source code to include malicious behavior that persists across all future sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted pull request descriptions and body content. There is a high risk that malicious instructions embedded in a PR body could influence the 'Self-Evolving' logic to modify the skill's instructions.
- Ingestion points: PR descriptions and body content processed during
gh pr createor link validation workflows. - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands within the PR body.
- Capability inventory: Access to Bash tool (executing
ghandgit), and implied file-write access to its ownSKILL.mdfile. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the PR body content before it is processed or used in the evolution loop.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Bash to execute
gh(GitHub CLI) andgitcommands. While these are used for intended repository management, the interpolation ofCONVERTED_BODY(derived from untrusted PR text) into thegh pr createcommand presents a command injection surface if the agent does not properly handle shell escaping. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's documentation (Example 3) explicitly references sensitive credential files (
.env.clickhouse). While used as an example for link conversion, referencing specific environment file paths encourages the agent to interact with or expose locations containing sensitive secrets.
Audit Metadata