symmetric-dogfooding
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines workflows where an AI agent processes outputs from external repositories to perform validation. This creates an attack surface where untrusted content from a repository could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the validation process.
- Ingestion points: Integration tests in
SKILL.md(Implementation Guide Phase 3) andexample-setup.mdingest "real outputs" from partner repositories. - Boundary markers: The provided templates do not define specific content delimiters or instructions to isolate external data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Read,Write, andBashtools to execute test suites and manage repository files. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or schema validation of external content is mandated before it is processed by the testing framework.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill templates and implementation examples reference external Git repositories for dependency management during the testing phase.
- Evidence: References to repositories under the
terrylicaorganization inexample-setup.md(e.g.,https://github.com/terrylica/rangebar-py) represent legitimate vendor-owned resources used for integration testing examples.
Audit Metadata