tcc-grant-audit

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several macOS system utilities to manage and audit privacy settings. It employs sqlite3 to read and verify TCC databases, tccutil and lsregister to manage application registrations, PlistBuddy and plutil for property list manipulation, osascript with JavaScript (JXA) for bundle identifier resolution, and codesign to ad-hoc sign temporary stub applications.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requires elevated privileges to perform its intended tasks. Modification of the system-wide TCC database in /Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/ requires sudo privileges, and the skill instructions correctly note that Full Disk Access (FDA) must be granted to the terminal environment to read protected system files.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data in the form of bundle identifiers and paths retrieved from system databases, which are then interpolated into shell commands and temporary configuration files. Ingestion points: Bundle identifiers are read from TCC.db and the Sequoia ScreenCaptureApprovals.plist file. Boundary markers: None are present; the skill treats identifiers retrieved from the OS as trusted for the cleanup operation. Capability inventory: The skill uses high-privilege tools such as tccutil, PlistBuddy, and lsregister to act on these identifiers. Sanitization: Shell commands use double-quoting to prevent word splitting, though identifiers are interpolated directly into temporary Info.plist XML files without explicit escaping.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 7, 2026, 02:12 AM