unlimited-ocr-batch-folder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script (
unlimited_ocr_batch_folder_parser.py) using theuv runcommand to process document folders. This is the primary mechanism for its OCR functionality. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it extracts text from untrusted external sources (PDFs and images).
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the files in the folder path provided to the
--folderflag inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no documented boundary markers or system instructions to prevent the agent from obeying instructions found within the parsed document content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash,Read,Write, andGlobtools. Malicious instructions in a parsed document could theoretically attempt to exploit these capabilities if the agent processes the OCR output as commands. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted OCR text is described, meaning any embedded malicious prompts are passed directly into the output markdown.
Audit Metadata