unlimited-ocr-parse-document
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (images and PDF files), which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. If an image or PDF contains malicious text, the agent might interpret the extracted content as instructions rather than data. Additionally, the 'Post-Execution Reflection' instructs the agent to modify its own skill files based on its findings, which could lead to accidental or malicious instruction corruption if the OCR output is flawed.
- Ingestion points: The
--inputparameter in theunlimited_ocr.pyscript accepts untrusted binary files including images and PDFs. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not define delimiters or specific 'ignore' directives to separate the extracted OCR text from the agent's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permission to use
Bash,Read,Write, andGlobtools, allowing it to modify files and execute system commands. - Sanitization: There is no documented process for sanitizing or escaping the text extracted from documents before it is integrated into the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script (
unlimited_ocr.py) using theuv runutility. This execution involves handling file paths and directory structures provided as user input. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches machine learning model weights and configuration files from HuggingFace repositories, specifically
baidu/Unlimited-OCRandmlx-community/Unlimited-OCR-mxfp8.
Audit Metadata