wechat-channels-video
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs dynamic script generation in
scripts/lib/launch-check.mjs. It creates a JavaScript file (entry.mjs) in a temporary system directory and executes it usingego-browser nodejs -e "await import(...)". This allows for the assembly and execution of code at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
child_process.spawnandspawnSyncto execute theego-browserbinary andnodescripts. This is the primary mechanism for its login checks and file serving utilities. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The script
scripts/serve-file.mjslaunches a local HTTP server that serves a user-defined file on127.0.0.1. The server is configured withAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *, which enables the browser to fetch the file for upload but also exposes the file's content to other local processes or browser tabs that can reach the local port. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted user content for video metadata.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied strings for
description,tags, andshort_titleare defined inreferences/inputs.mdand processed inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when these strings are injected into the browser context via
page.evaluateanddocument.execCommand. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system access (via
nodeandserve-file.mjs) and browser automation capabilities through theego-browserwrapper. - Sanitization: Input sanitization is limited to WeChat platform compliance (e.g., character length and symbol whitelists for titles) rather than security-focused filtering.
Audit Metadata