bmad-story-automator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes instructions and mechanisms designed to override default agent behaviors and safety constraints.
- Prompt templates in
data/prompts/retro.mdanddata/prompts/create.mdincorporate the#YOLOtag and explicit commands such as "Do NOT wait for user input" and "EVERYTHING SHOULD BE AUTOMATED." - The orchestrator's documentation in
data/stop-hook-recovery.mddirects sub-agents to "Never wait for user," bypassing the standard interaction model intended for human oversight. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell command execution and dynamic script generation.
- The Python implementation uses
subprocess.runto managetmuxsessions,gitoperations, and other system utilities. - It dynamically generates bash runner scripts and command files in the system's temporary directory (
/tmp) and executes them viatmux respawn-pane(documented insrc/story_automator/core/tmux_runtime.py). - It specifically configures command strings to include the
claude --dangerously-skip-permissionsflag for child sessions, which is explicitly intended to bypass standard permission prompts for tool usage. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a mechanism to control the agent's lifecycle and prevent user intervention.
- It installs a 'Stop hook' by modifying local configuration files such as
.claude/settings.jsonor.codex/hooks.json(seesrc/story_automator/core/stop_hooks.py). - This hook executes a command that checks for an active automation marker and outputs a JSON block to the agent platform to prevent the user from stopping the session while the automation is active, representing a denial-of-service against user-initiated termination.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata