bmad-story-automator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes instructions and mechanisms designed to override default agent behaviors and safety constraints.
  • Prompt templates in data/prompts/retro.md and data/prompts/create.md incorporate the #YOLO tag and explicit commands such as "Do NOT wait for user input" and "EVERYTHING SHOULD BE AUTOMATED."
  • The orchestrator's documentation in data/stop-hook-recovery.md directs sub-agents to "Never wait for user," bypassing the standard interaction model intended for human oversight.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell command execution and dynamic script generation.
  • The Python implementation uses subprocess.run to manage tmux sessions, git operations, and other system utilities.
  • It dynamically generates bash runner scripts and command files in the system's temporary directory (/tmp) and executes them via tmux respawn-pane (documented in src/story_automator/core/tmux_runtime.py).
  • It specifically configures command strings to include the claude --dangerously-skip-permissions flag for child sessions, which is explicitly intended to bypass standard permission prompts for tool usage.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a mechanism to control the agent's lifecycle and prevent user intervention.
  • It installs a 'Stop hook' by modifying local configuration files such as .claude/settings.json or .codex/hooks.json (see src/story_automator/core/stop_hooks.py).
  • This hook executes a command that checks for an active automation marker and outputs a JSON block to the agent platform to prevent the user from stopping the session while the automation is active, representing a denial-of-service against user-initiated termination.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 22, 2026, 11:23 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bmad-story-automator