code-reviewer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/read_machine_context.pymodifiessys.pathat runtime using a path computed relative to the script's location (parents[3] / "scripts") to import thecontext_jsonmodule. Additionally,scripts/terminal_artifact_envelope.pyperforms Base64 decoding of data objects for artifact embedding. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts, including
scripts/snapshot_worktree.py,scripts/verify_candidate_binding.py, andtests/make_review_fixture.py, utilizesubprocess.runandsubprocess.Popento executegitandpython3commands with arguments derived from the skill's operational state. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted source code (the 'Candidate') and related JSON manifests, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Source code files within the targeted Git repository and EVIDENCE-MANIFEST.json files.
- Boundary markers: Instructions in
SKILL.mdmandate the use of specific summary tools and advise against full ingestion of raw data to maintain context efficiency. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (via
git), read arbitrary local files within the review root, and write findings to report files. - Sanitization: The skill uses
scripts/read_machine_context.pyto selectively read JSON fields via JSON Pointers, reducing exposure to untrusted content. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
tests/make_review_fixture.pyscript programmatically modifies file permissions usingtarget.chmod(0o755)to set executable bits on generated test artifacts.
Audit Metadata