confirmation-testing-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted external data, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: The workflow processes fix commit SHAs, Jira comments, defect reports, and build metadata, as described in
SKILL.mdand the provided evaluation tasks.\n - Boundary markers: None specified. There are no instructions to use delimiters or explicit warning markers to differentiate external data from the agent's operational instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to execute shell commands (
git merge-base) and run local test files using the Node.js test runner (node --test), creating a pathway from data ingestion to command execution.\n - Sanitization: The skill does not define validation or sanitization routines for input strings such as commit identifiers or reproduction steps before they are used in commands or logic.
Audit Metadata