webhook-delivery-tester

The handler is not ready for launch based on the supplied captures: its body format, field names, and status handling do not match observed Parcelo deliveries, and it acknowledges updates that it later drops. The embedded fallback secret and missing delivery deduplication are additional security concerns. No source edits or tests were performed here; Friday should be a no-go until the wire format and signature scheme are confirmed, the handler is corrected, and tests pass against the captured deliveries.

The visible code and documents suggest webhook correctness and integrity risks: per-pod deduplication does not reliably prevent retries from being processed across pods, and the reported handling did not prevent stale events from overwriting newer state. The fragment itself provides no evidence of malware or unauthorized data collection. The webhook implementation is not visible here, so its exact behavior cannot be independently confirmed.

No clear malware or intentional system compromise is shown. The primary concern is sensitive customer and payment-related data embedded in replay fixtures and the documented broad retention/access to raw captures. The one-year tolerance is explicitly test-only in the visible code, but should remain isolated from production settings.