sfd-video-overlay
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/overlay.tsexecutesffmpegandffprobeusing the Bun shell. Although argument escaping is handled, the script permits processing of arbitrary file paths provided via command-line arguments without restriction. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The execution path for the
ffmpegbinary can be overridden through theFFMPEG_BINenvironment variable inscripts/overlay.ts. This pattern could be exploited to redirect execution to a malicious binary if the execution environment is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: There is a potential for FFmpeg filtergraph injection in
scripts/overlay.ts. ThefontDirparameter is concatenated into the FFmpeg filter string without sanitizing internal filter separators such as the colon (:). An attacker could provide a craftedfontDir(e.g.,/path:drawtext=textfile='/etc/passwd') to inject additional filters that might read sensitive system files and render their contents into the output video. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill can read from and write to arbitrary file system paths via the
inputPathandoutputPatharguments. If an agent is manipulated into 'processing' sensitive files, this capability could be used to expose system data by embedding it into a video file. - [SAFE]: The skill properly identifies its source and homepage on the author's GitHub repository, matching the expected vendor context for 'tfcbot'.
Audit Metadata