strix-pentest

Warn

Audited by Socket on Oct 27, 2026

5 alerts found:

Securityx3Anomalyx2
SecurityMEDIUM
SKILL.md

SUSPICIOUS: the skill’s behavior matches its stated pen-testing purpose, but that purpose is itself a high-risk offensive capability for an AI agent. The main concerns are autonomous scanning/exploitation, explicit permission-bypass guidance, and installing executable tooling from a personal GitHub repo outside an official package channel. This is not confirmed malware, but it is a high-risk security skill that should not be treated as benign developer guidance.

Confidence: 86%Severity: 82%
SecurityMEDIUM
src/strix_cli_claude/sandbox_tool_server.py

No clear evidence of stealthy malware (no obfuscation, no exfiltration to hardcoded domains, no persistence), but the module is a high-privilege remote execution tool server: it can run arbitrary bash commands in a PTY, execute arbitrary Python code, edit/write files under /workspace, perform arbitrary outbound HTTP requests, and evaluate arbitrary browser JavaScript. The security model relies entirely on the bearer token; if misconfigured or compromised, this becomes extremely dangerous.

Confidence: 78%Severity: 88%
SecurityMEDIUM
src/strix_cli_claude/mcp_server.py

No direct evidence of stealthy malware (no obfuscation, no local persistence, no explicit exfiltration) is present in the provided fragment. However, the module is architected as a high-privilege proxy that forwards largely unvalidated, caller-controlled tool execution requests (including shell/Python/JS execution and arbitrary HTTP/filesystem operations) to an environment-configured remote endpoint using a bearer token. If the remote tool server is malicious/compromised or if an attacker can reach the MCP tool interface or influence tool parameters/configuration, this component can enable serious compromise. The snippet is also incomplete, so filesystem safety and authorization controls cannot be confirmed.

Confidence: 60%Severity: 82%
AnomalyLOW
src/strix_cli_claude/main.py

No definitive evidence of classic malware (e.g., backdoors, data-stealing routines, persistence) is visible in the provided fragment. However, the module is a high-risk orchestration component: it launches an external LLM CLI with explicit permission-bypass flags and forwards all process environment variables to that subprocess, while embedding an exploit-focused instruction prompt. Even if intended for sanctioned pentesting, this design increases the likelihood of unsafe actions, secret exposure, and supply-chain/control-plane abuse. Full confidence requires reviewing the rest of the module(s) that construct mcp_config_path, initial_prompt, sandbox enforcement, and how tool permissions/MCP access are actually restricted.

Confidence: 62%Severity: 66%
AnomalyLOW
src/strix_cli_claude/sandbox.py

No explicit malicious payload (no exfiltration/backdoor/cryptomining/reverse shell) is evident in this fragment. However, there are meaningful supply-chain and blast-radius risks: (1) installs trivy via `curl ... | sh` inside the container (supply-chain execution risk), and (2) optionally mounts the host Docker socket and sets it to 666, giving the container near-unrestricted Docker control (major privilege escalation risk if the sandbox can be influenced). Overall, treat as a high-risk sandbox/orchestration component requiring strong trust boundaries and supply-chain controls (pinning/verifying installers, restricting image/local_sources).

Confidence: 72%Severity: 66%
Audit Metadata
Analyzed At
Oct 27, 2026, 11:59 PM
Package URL
pkg:socket/skills-sh/tghastings%2Fstrix-claude-code%2Fstrix-pentest%2F@8481a9fe17142b1b02e3d226d3be2d93fe82e705