blender-stop-condition-decider
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources such as
blender-recipe-decomposerandacceptance-criteria-builder(specifically the 'Single recipe scope' and 'Measurable acceptance rows') without implementing safety boundaries or sanitization steps. This creates a potential for malicious instructions embedded in that data to influence the agent's behavior during the handoff process. - Ingestion points: Defined in
SKILL.mdunder the 'Input schema' section, which consumes scope and acceptance criteria from external skills. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to wrap input data in delimiters or warnings to disregard embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to determine and trigger the 'handoff' to subsequent skills in the catalog, allowing it to control the workflow sequence.
- Sanitization: Absent. The operating procedure does not include steps for validating or escaping the content of the ingested data before it is formatted into the stop condition output.
Audit Metadata