skills/thatdudealso/dotfiles/figma/Gen Agent Trust Hub

figma

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to the official Figma MCP server at https://mcp.figma.com/mcp and downloads design assets. Figma is a well-known service, and these connections are necessary for the skill's primary function.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted design data and metadata from Figma design files.
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched from Figma nodes and metadata using tools like get_design_context and get_metadata (references/figma-tools-and-prompts.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions in SKILL.md explicitly direct the agent to prioritize existing project code conventions and design tokens over the raw output generated from Figma.
  • Capability inventory: The agent uses the ingested design data to generate React/Tailwind code and download design assets.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit description of sanitizing or escaping the Figma node content before processing.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation in references/figma-mcp-config.md provides instructions for configuring a FIGMA_OAUTH_TOKEN as an environment variable. This is a standard and recommended practice for secret management in development environments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 02:20 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — figma