agentmail
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill instructions direct the agent to access and source the user's
~/.zshenvfile to retrieve theAGENTMAIL_API_KEY. Shell profile files are sensitive locations that often contain credentials and private configurations for various services. - File: SKILL.md
- Evidence: "If it is missing, the key lives in
~/.zshenv; source it rather than asking the user to paste it again." - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: This skill is designed to ingest and process email content from external senders, which is a primary vector for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions embedded in an email (e.g., in the body or metadata) could be interpreted by the agent as commands.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches external content via
GET /v0/inboxes/{inbox_id}/messagesand thescripts/wait-for-email.shpolling script. - Boundary markers: While the skill suggests using
extracted_textto strip reply trails, it does not mandate the use of defensive delimiters or "ignore instructions" headers when presenting email content to the agent. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute network commands (
curl), write to the file system (as seen in attachment recipes), and interact with other tools in the agent environment. - Sanitization: No sanitization or safety-filtering logic for the incoming email body is provided or required by the instructions.
Audit Metadata