commitpush
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from the repository's code diffs and commit history to inform its automated commit message generation. This represents a vulnerability surface where maliciously crafted comments or log entries could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through 'git status', 'git diff', and 'git log' commands as specified in Phase 1 and Phase 3 of the SKILL.md workflow.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or boundary markers to isolate repository content from the agent's core instructions.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including the ability to stage files ('git add'), create commits ('git commit'), and upload them to a remote server ('git push').
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] Sanitization: While the skill performs extensive scanning for credentials and secrets, it lacks specific sanitization or filtering logic designed to detect or neutralize prompt injection attempts hidden within the code or history.
- [SAFE]: The skill includes a comprehensive reference file (references/sensitive-patterns.md) used to scan for and prevent the accidental exposure of sensitive information like API keys, private keys, and environment files. This is a defensive security feature aligned with the skill's primary purpose.
- [SAFE]: References to the external repository 'github.com/thatjuan/agent-skills' and the 'thatjuan' vendor name are associated with the skill's author and installation infrastructure.
Audit Metadata