fal-studio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes natural language input (user briefs) to generate design specifications and AI prompts. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the intake data.
- Ingestion points:
references/site-flow.mdandreferences/app-flow.mdprocess user-provided briefs and intake batches. - Boundary markers: The workflow uses intermediate files like
DESIGN-SPEC.mdto structure the agent's tasks, though it lacks explicit delimiters for raw untrusted data. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write files to the repository and execute shell commands for media processing.
- Sanitization: The instructions recommend runtime validation using
ArkTypeorzodfor API request bodies. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to download media assets from the fal.ai content delivery network.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdmandates downloading all generated assets (images, video, audio) from temporary fal.ai URLs into the localpublic/generated/folder to ensure repository self-sufficiency. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs local command-line utilities for video processing tasks.
- Evidence:
references/scroll-scrub.mdprovidesffmpegcommand strings for re-encoding video for scroll-based animation and generating frame sequences. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates communication with official fal.ai endpoints for media generation.
- Evidence: The skill makes network requests to
fal.runandqueue.fal.runto generate content. - The instructions prioritize security by requiring the
FAL_KEYto be handled only in server-side environment variables and never exposed in client-side bundles or public code.
Audit Metadata